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1. The general trend
The effectiveness of foreign nation judgments has been a staple topic in
the legal literature of the United States. In view of the large scholarly
output already existing,' this report essays no more than summation of
principal aspects of the current situation. Codified treatment of for-
eign-nation-judgment recognition and enforcement is a recent development
in the United States; 2 and treaty solutions to problems of this nature have
just reached the nascent state. While the relevant law has been largely
judge-made, the receptivity of United States courts to foreign-nation judg-
ments has been characterized as extreme. In an important recent com-
mentary, Professors von Mehren and Trautman synopsized the current
practice: 3
*Professor of Law, Rutgers Law School (Newark). A.B., Cornell, 1954; LL.B., Colum-
bia, 1959. This paper was prepared for the Eighth International Congress of Comparative
Law, to be held under the auspices of the International Academy of Comparative Law at
Pescara, Italy in September 1970.
1On recognition and enforcement of foreign-nation judgments in the United States, see
Reese, The Status in This Country of Judgments Rendered Abroad, 50 Colum. L. Rev. 783
(1950); Smit, International Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel in the United States, 9
U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 44 (1962). On treatment of United States judgments abroad, see Nadel-
mann, Non-Recognition of American Money Judgments Abroad and What to Do About It, 42
Iowa L. Rev. 236 (1957). An outstanding recent contribution considers both domestic and
foreign practice: von Mehren & Trautman, Recognition of Foreign Adjudications: A Survey
and a Suggested Approach, 81 Hay. L. Rev. 1601 (1968).
The judicial output, while not large, has been increasing. See Peterson, Res Judicata and
Foreign Country Judgments, 24 Ohio St. L. J. 291, 295-26 (1963) (reported cases involving
foreign nation judgments exceeded eleven per year during the period 1937-62).
2See Commissioners' Prefatory Note to the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recog-
nition Act, 9B U.L.A. 64 (1966). Diverse state statutes relevant to particular aspects of
extranational adjudication are described in Peterson, supra note 1, at 296-99.3von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 1, 81 Harv. L. Rev. at 1602-03. Examples of the
current tendency to treat sister-state and foreign-nation judgments alike include Cherun v.
Frishman, 236 F. Supp. 292 (D.D.C. 1964); Neporany v. Kir, 5 A.D.2d 438, 173 N.Y.S.2d
146 (1st Dep't 1958); Adamsen v. Adamsen, 195 A.2d 418 (Conn. 1963).
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Doubtless influenced by interstate practice as shaped by constitutional com-
pulsions, a state [of the United States] ordinarily recognizes and enforces an
internationally foreign judgment to the extent that the judgment was enforce-
able in the rendering country, if in its view that country had adjudicatory
jurisdiction in the international sense and utilized fair procedures. Such prac-
tice reflects not only a policy against harassing or evasive tactics, but also
other relevant policies ... including that of fostering the elements of stability
and unity essential to an international order in which many aspects of life are
not confined within the limits of any single jurisdiction.
"Recognition" in this context refers to the res-judicata status of a foreign
judgment; it occurs when the foreign adjudication is held to bind the
parties. "Enforcement" denotes the authorization of affirmative relief based
on the foreign judgment; in this country, enforcement is effected via the
device of a "judgment on the judgment" -a domestic judgment rendered
pursuant to a claim predicated upon the foreign judgment.4
Two principal concerns dominate the United States literature in this
field. One has been aptly capsulated, and assiduously pursued by Professor
Nadelmann: Non-Recognition of American Money Judgments Abroad and
What to Do About It.5 The other involves the adequacy of the general
United States approach to foreign adjudications. Professors von Mehren
and Trautman, among others, suggest that United States jurists have not
adverted sufficiently to the differences between interstate and international
settings; they propose distinct development of the basic policies that
should guide practice with respect to internationally foreign judgments.6
Two recent developments in the United States reflect the general trend
of decisions concerning recognition and enforcement of foreign-nation
judgments.7 The Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws (1967) includes
a section and commentary directed squarely to internationally foreign judg-
4See Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws at 374 (Proposed Official Draft 1967).
See id. § 100 comment d, § 102 comment g.
542 Iowa L. Rev. 236 (1957).
6von Mehren & Trautman, supra note I; Smit, supra note 1. But see Restatement
(Second) of Conflict of Laws § 98 comment b (Proposed Official Draft 1967); cf. Peterson,
supra note 1.
On the need for distinguishing between interstate and international conflicts cases generally,
compare Ehrenzweig, Interstate and International Conflict of Laws: A Plea for Segregation,
41 Minn. L. Rev. 717 (1954), with Scoles, Interstate and International Distinctions in Conflict
of Laws in the United States, 54 Calif. L. Rev. 1599 (1966).7Recognition and enforcement have not been limited to determinations of foreign courts
of general jurisdiction. Decisions of special courts and legislative, executive or administrative
agencies acting judicially have been accorded the same measure of respect. See Restatement
(Second) of Conflict of Laws § 92 comment a (Proposed Official Draft 1967); Regierungs-
praesident Land Nordrhein Westfalen v. Rosenthal, 17 A.D.2d 145, 232 N.Y.S.2d 963 (1st
Dep't 1962) (judicially reviewable administrative agency restitution order); Couden-
hove-Kalergi v. Dieterle, 36N.Y.S.2d 313 (Sup. Ct. 1942) (award of permanent arbitration
court for theatrical profession); von Engelbrechten v. Galvanoni & Nevy Bros., 59 Misc.2d
721 (Civ. Ct. N.Y.C. 1969) (award of Hamburg Amical Court of Arbitration).
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ments. While the original Restatement (1934) does not present any distinct
general position on foreign-nation judgments, the new effort states in bold
face:8
A valid judgment rendered in a foreign nation after a fair trial in a con-
tested proceeding will be recognized in the United States so far as the
immediate parties and the underlying cause of action are concerned.
And, motivated in large part by the desire to "make it more likely that
judgments rendered in [states of the United States] will be recognized
abroad, 9 the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws has adopted the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition
Act (1962), which is intended to codify settled practice on the recognition
of extranational judgments.
2. Recognition of sister-state and foreign-nation
judgments: principal distinctions
Among states of the United States, recognition practice is controlled by
the full-faith-and-credit clause of the federal Constitution. 10 The United
States Supreme Court, ultimate arbiter of questions arising under the
clause, has consistently stressed the judgment-nationalizing function of the
full faith and credit mandate. To summarize the Court's position, a valid
judgment of one state, even if it disregards the dominant interest or policy
of another, must be recognized as the national answer to the litigated
episode. Application of the clause, under Supreme Court supervision, has
generally resulted in operation of the state judicial systems, after a valid
judgment has been obtained in any one of the systems, as integrated units
of the larger federal system."
The framework within which internationally foreign judgments are con-
sidered by United States courts is, of course, markedly different. No
full-faith-and-credit obligation operates internationally. Thus, recognition
practice derives from the recognition forum's policies, rather than from any
mutually binding or superior legal precept.12 Moreover, the United States
Supreme Court has not spoken for the nation in this area.'3 At present, it is
8§ 98 (Proposed Official Draft).
9Commissioners' Prefatory Note, 9B U.L.A. 64 (1966).
1OU.S. Const. art. IV § 1; 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (implementing statute).
"See B. Currie, The Constitution and the "Transitory" Cause of Action (Part 2), 73
Harv. L. Rev. 268 (1959); Reese & Johnson, The Scope of Full Faith and Credit to
Judgments, 49 Colum. L. Rev. 153 (1949); cf. note 50 infra.
12See Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws at 335 (Proposed Official Draft 1967).13While the act-of-state doctrine is "exclusively an aspect of federal law," Banco Nacion-
al de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 425 (1964), court judgments resolving private disputes
generally fall outside the compass of the doctrine as it is presently defined. Restatement
(Second) of Foreign Relations Law § 41 comment d (1965 rev. ed.). But cf. Scoles, supra note
6, at 1607; note 78 infra and accompanying text.
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generally assumed that state law determines the recognition due to foreign
nation judgments.14
In addition to the compulsion of the full-faith-and-credit clause, and the
supervisory role of the United States Supreme Court, other factors oper-
ating in an interstate, but not in an international, setting, include similarity
in adjudicatory procedures and standards and in the training and roles of
professional jurists. Overall, while the integrity of a state or national
judicial system requires reasonably strict application of res judicata doc-
trines, no similarly impelling consideration has operated internationally. 15
3. Policies underlying recognition; the disparaged reciprocity doctrine
As the rationale for its black-letter position on foreign-nation judgments,
the Restatement tersely offers the res-judicata principle: 16 the public in-
terest requires that there be an end of litigation. Professors von Mehren
and Trautman have presented the fundamental policies more elaborately 17
and have urged sharper evaluation of these policies in the variant settings
in which questions of the effectiveness of foreign judgments arise in court.
However, along with the Restatement and most other academic writers,
they discount reciprocity as a recognition prerequisite.'
Uncertainty as to the situation in the United States concerning recipro-
city as a condition to recognition has been engendered by the Supreme
14Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Tremblay, 223 U.S. 185 (1912) (state court failure to accord
conclusive effect to foreign-country judgment presents no federal question reviewable by
United States Supreme Court); Republic of Iraq v. First National Bank, 350 F.2d 645 (7th
Cir. 1965) (applying Illinois law to deny recognition to Iraqi guardianship decree); Restate-
ment (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 98 comment e (Proposed Official Draft 1967); cf. Leflar,
Conflict of Laws, 1967 Ann. Surv. Am. L. 1, 5-6; Reese, The Status in This Country of
Judgments Rendered Abroad, 50 Colum. L. Rev. 783, 786-90 (1950).
15See von Mehren & Trautman, Recognition of Foreign Adjudications: A Survey and a
Suggested Approach, 81 Harv. L. Rev. 1601, 1605-07 (1968).
16Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 98 comment b (Proposed Official Draft
1967). As to the claims, defenses and parties precluded by the foreign judgment, the rendition
forum's rules ordinarily control. Id. § 98 comment f. For finer distinctions, see von Mehren &
Trautman, supra note 15, at 1671-95. See also Carrington, Collateral Estoppel and Foreign
Judgments, 24 Ohio St. L. J. 381 (1963).
17Five universal policies are identified, with the qualification that the weight given to
each will depend in part on attitudes the recognition forum holds on related questions:
avoidance of duplication of effort; protection of the successful litigant against harassment or
evasive tactics on the part of his opponent; rendering choice of forum less dependent on the
availability of local enforcement; fostering stability and unity in the international order; and, in
certain cases, forum conveniens-deference to the rendition forum as the more appropriate
adjudicator from the viewpoint of litigational convenience, or based on choice of law consid-
erations. von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 15, at 1603-04.
8 1d. at 1660-62; see Lenhoff, Reciprocity and the Law of Foreign Judgments: A
Historical-Critical Analysis, 16 La. L. Rev. 465 (1956); Reese, The Status in This Country of
Judgments Rendered Abroad, 50 Colum. L. Rev. 783, 793 (1950). But cf. Nadelmann, The
Common Market Judgments Convention and a Hague Conference Recommendation: What
Steps Next?, 82 Harv. L. Rev. 1282 (1969).
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Court's 1895 decision in Hilton v. Guyot.'9 While four of the Justices
opposed any judicial application of "the principle of retorsion," the
five-man majority applied a reciprocity test to a judgment obtained in
France by a French plaintiff against United States defendants. As the
Restatement commentary points out,20 the Hilton case involved an appeal
from a lower federal court. The decision directly addressed practice in the
federal courts. State courts have not considered it binding upon them,
although some have adopted its reasoning. 2 1 Moreover, under the current
assumption that the federal courts are to apply the law of the state in which
they sit in determining the effect that should be accorded to an in-
ternationally foreign judgment,2 2 it appears that Hilton's limited reciprocity
ruling retains scant precedential value even for the federal judiciary.
Laws adopted in Massachusetts and New Hampshire are notable ex-
ceptiois to the apparent anti-reciprocity trend. Massachusetts, in 1966,
enacted the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act with the
addition of a reciprocity requirement. 23 New Hampshire, in 1957, reacted
to Quebec's refusal to recognize foreign judgments by providing that the
effect accorded to New Hampshire judgments in Canada will be the mea-
sure of the effect given to Canadian judgments in New Hampshire.2 4
The fear has been expressed that resort to state law on questions of
foreign-judgment recognition may lead to application of archaic state prece-
dent on reciprocity. An apparent illustration is Svenska Handelsbanken v.
Carlson, a 1966 decision of the federal district court for Massachusetts. 25
Although the court, in this diversity case, relied on early nine-
teenth-century Massachusetts state-court precedent to disqualify a Swed-
ish judgment on the ground of lack of reciprocity, its action proved to be an
accurate forecast of the current view of the Massachusetts legislature.
Moreover, the foreign judgment in question had been rendered by default,
and might not have survived a jurisdictional test. (Extending a rather long
19159 U.S. 113.2 0Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Law § 98 comment e (Proposed Official Draft
1967).21See Ehrenzweig, Conflict of Laws 165-66 (1962).
Professor Smit, while criticizing Hilton's reliance on reciprocity, indicates agreement with
the result based on his view of the diluted res-judicata policy applicable to foreign judgments.
Smit, International Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel in the United States, 9 U.C.L.A.
L. Rev. 44, 68 (1962) (foreign personal judgments should bind domiciliaries of the adjudicat-
ing state and non-domiciliaries who selected the forum, but as to other non-domiciliaries, they
should constitute only prima facie evidence of the merits of the original claim). For a contrary
appraisal, see Peterson, Res Judicata and Foreign Country Judgments, 24 Ohio St. L. J. 291
(1963).22See note 14 supra.23Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 230 § 23A (1968 Supp.).24N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. 524:11 (1967 Supp.). See also note 107 infra.
25258 F. Supp. 448.
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arm, the Swedish court proceeded against the estate of a United States
domiciliary based on a guaranty given by the decedent to a Swedish bank.)
In any event, the district court passed on to the merits, and swiftly re-
solved the case in favor of the Swedish plaintiff. In accord with the
virtually unanimous view of commentators, and more likely indicators of
the position toward which contemporary state judiciaries would incline,
older New York decisions herald the demise of the reciprocity rule of
Hilton.26
4. Conditions to recognition
The disparaged reciprocity test aside, the opinion in Hilton v. Guyot
presents a catalogue of conditions to recognition that remain vital in United
States practice. These conditions are that27
there has been opportunity for a full and fair trial abroad before a court of
competent jurisdiction, conducting a trial upon regular proceedings, after due
citation or voluntary appearance of the defendant, and under a system of
jurisprudence likely to secure an impartial administration of justice between
the citizens of its own country and those of other countries, and there is
nothing to show either prejudice in the court or in the system of law under
which it is sitting, or fraud in procuring the judgment, or any other special
reason why the comity of this nation should not allow it full effect....
In practice, principal focus has been placed on the question of the
foreign tribunal's jurisdictional base: Did that tribunal have sufficient rela-
tionship with the parties and episode in litigation to justify its exercise of
adjudicatory authority? 28 It is uncertain whether the recognition forum will
accord res-judicata effect to the foreign tribunal's fact findings resolving a
challenge to its jurisdiction. 29 Nor is there a settled approach when a base
satisfactory to the recognition forum was present, but the rendering court
purported to act pursuant to a base regarded by the recognition forum as
unsatisfactory.30
Commentators, both here and abroad, have contrasted jurisdictional
26 Johnston v. Compagnie G~nrale Transatlantique, 242 N.Y. 381, 152 N.E. 121 (1926);
Cowans v. Ticonderoga Pulp & Paper Co., 219 App. Div. 120, 219 N.Y. Supp. 284, offd,
246 N.Y. 603, 159 N.E. 669 (1927).
27159 U.S. at 202.
28von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 15, at 16 10 (compliance with appropriate jurisdic-
tional standards satisfies the "hallmark" function of suggesting that the rendering system
shows fairness and judgment generally in its handling of litigation involving significant foreign
elements). Cf. text at notes 94-99 infra.
2See Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 98 comment f (Proposed Official Draft
1967).
a°Cf. Supplementary Protocol to the Hague Conference Draft Convention on the Recog-
nition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters (1966) art. 2,
English text in 15 Am. J. Comp. L. 369 (1967) (recognition discretionary in these situations).
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bases appropriate for international recognition purposes 3 l with bases found
in domestic law, but unacceptable in the international sphere.3 2 Unaccept-
able or "exorbitant" bases (principally nationality, domicile or residence
of the plaintiff, presence of any assets of a non-resident defendant,
and-the common law contribution to the list-defendant's transitory pres-
ence) generally are not expected even by the rendition forum to elicit
recognition outside.3 3 Particularly disturbing to jurists who stress the criti-
cal importance of a fair jurisdictional base as a recognition prerequisite is a
feature of the Common Market convention concerning jurisdiction and
judgments, signed in September, 1968. The convention provides for en-
forcement in all of the member nations of judgments against non-residents
of the Common Market obtained pursuant to the exorbitant jurisdictional
rules of individual member nations. At the same time, the convention
excludes even the original assertion of jurisdiction over a Common Market
resident on the basis of an exorbitant rule.3 4
Foreign judgments will not be discounted in the United States on the
sole ground that the rendition forum's choice of law did not comport with
the choice that would have been made by the recognition forum. 3 5 How-
ever, it is evident that choice-of-law concerns almost always bear upon
31See von Mehren & Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79
Harv. L. Rev. 1121 (1966).32See Nadelmann, Jurisdictionally Improper Fora, in XXth Century Comparative and
Conflicts Law-Legal Essays in Honor of Hessel E. Yntema 321 (Nadelmann, von Mehren &
Hazard eds. 1961). See also Supplementary Protocol to the Hague Conference Draft Con-
vention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial
Matters (1966) art. 4, English text in 15 Am. J. Comp. L. 369, 370 (1967) (listing six
unacceptable bases).33See Graupner, Some Recent Aspects of the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Judgments in Western Europe, 12 Int'l & Comp. L. Q. 367, 375 (1963); Nadelmann,
Non-Recognition of American Money Judgments Abroad and What to Do About It, 42 Iowa
L. Rev. 236, 261 (1957).34See Nadelmann, Jurisdictionally Improper Fora in Treaties on Recognition of Judg-
ments: The Common Market Draft, 67 Colum. L. Rev. 995 (1967); Nadelmann, The Com-
mon Market Judgments Convention and a Hague Conference Recommendation: What Steps
Next?, 82 Harv. L. Rev. 1282 (1969). The Common Market convention appears in 8 Int'l
Legal Materials (1969); salient features are discussed in Hay, The Common Market Draft
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments-Some Considerations of
Policy and Interpretation, 16 Am. J. Comp. L. 149 (1968).
,E.g., Watts v. Swiss Bank Corp., 305 N.Y.S. 2d 233 (A.D. Ist Dep't 1969). The same
position is reflected in recent international efforts to deal with judgment recognition. See Draft
Hague Conference Convention on the Recognition of Divorces and Legal Separations (1968)
art. 6(b), English text in 16 Am. J. Comp. L. 582, 583 (1968); Draft Hague Conference
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil and Com-
mercial Matters (1966) art. 7, English text in 15 Am. J. Comp. L. 362, 363 (1967) (recognition
may not be refused for the sole reason that the court of the state of origin has applied a law
other than that which would have been applicable according to the rules of private in-
ternational law of the state addressed).
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non-recognition dispositions broadly justified on "public policy" grounds. 36
Also normally excluded in the United States as a justification for
non-recognition is the existence of an error of fact or law made by the
rendering court in ruling on the merits. 37
Recognition may not be granted, consistent with due-process fundamen-
tals, if the defendant did not receive notice of the proceedings abroad in
sufficient time to enable him to defend. 38 Whether the judgment be domes-
tic or foreign, "in rem" classification no longer insulates it from attack on
the ground of inadequate notice. 39 Where the relevant statute of the rendi-
tion forum does not mandate fair notice, but such notice was in fact given
in the particular case, and no other disqualifying factor is present, the
judgment should qualify for recognition. 40
Fraud in obtaining the judgment ranks with inadequate notice as a
disqualifying factor. Disqualification will ordinarily result if a fraud defense
is established under either the rendition forum's or the recognition forum's
standard. 41 Traditionally, courts in the United States have distinguished
extrinsic fraud, which relates to defendant's opportunity to be heard, from
intrinsic fraud, which concerns the presentation of false testimony and
other improprieties engaged in by the successful party during the trial
itself. It has been the rule that only intrinsic fraud warrants attack on a
judgment no longer amenable to direct challenge on appeal. 42 However, the
distinction, often "shadowy and uncertain of application," has been dis-
3 6See text at notes 50-55 infra. For a discussion of situations in which choice-of-law
considerations may properly affect the decision whether or not to recognize a foreign adjudi-
cation, see von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 15, at 1636-54.3 7Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 106 comment a (Proposed Official Draft
1967); Reese, The Status in This Country of Judgments Rendered Abroad, 50 Colum. L. Rev.
783, 789 (1950). But see Mont. Rev. Code Ann. 93-1001-27 (1947); Ore. Rev. Stat. 43.190
(1963) (foreign nation judgments against a thing are conclusive, but as against a person, the
judgment creates only a presumption rebuttable by showing of want of jurisdiction or notice,
collusion, fraud or clear mistake of law or fact); cf. von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 15,
at 1666 (if, in the rendition forum, rulings on the law of another nation are not subject to
appeal, review may be appropriate in the recognition forum).
38E.g., Paramythiotis' Estate, 15 Misc.2d 133, 181 N.Y.S. 2d 590 (Sur. Ct. 1958).
3 9See Schroeder v. New York, 371 U.S. 208 (1962); Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank
&Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950).4 0See von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 15, at 1663. In this situation, however, a
questionable Supreme Court precedent disqualifies a sister state judgment. Wuchter v. Pizzuti,
276 U.S. 13 (1928) (Brandeis, Holmes and Stone dissenting); see Boivin v. Talcott, 102 F.
Supp. 979 (N.D. Ohio 1951) (applying the Wuchter rule to deny effect to a Canadian
judgment).41See Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 115 comments c, f (Proposed Official
Draft 1967) (distinguishing sister-state and foreign-nation judgments in this regard. As to the
former, the rendering court's standard is indicated as the sole measure). But cf. Cardy v.
Cardy, 23 A.D. 2d 117, 258 N.Y.S. 2d 955 (1st Dep't 1965) (Quebec consent judgment
recognized despite alleged fradulent procurement).42 See Restatement (Second), supra note 41, § 155 comment d.
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carded in federal practice and in some of the states. 43 Its eventual elimina-
tion for foreign as well as domestic judgments may be anticipated. 44 Where
a fraud defense is raised by a citizen of the rendition forum, the court may
be reluctant to allow the attack; in this situation the recognition forum is
likely to view the rendition forum as the more appropriate adjudicator. 45
A foreign judgment will not be credited prior to the time it acquires
res-judicata effect in the rendition forum. Even as to sister state adjudica-
tions, full faith and credit has so far been required only for final judg-
ments.46 While the pendency elsewhere of an earlier instituted action is not
generally a bar to adjudication of the same claim even in a domestic setting,
"prior action pending" may be urged as grounds for a discretionary stay.4 7
Judgments on foreign-nation governmental claims-penal and revenue
judgments-are not enforced by courts in the United States. 48 However,
foreign criminal judgments, although not enforced, may be recognized for
specific purposes such as exclusion of aliens, application of multiple
offender statutes, and double jeopardy rulings. 49
4aSee 5 Weinstein, Korn & Miller, New York Civil Practice Par. 5015.09 (1966).
4But see McKay v. McAlexander, 268 F.2d 35, 39 (9th Cir. 1959); Lucas v. Lucas, 232
F. Supp. 466, 467-68 (D. Canal Zone 1964) (intrinsic fraud does not warrant rejection of
foreign-nation judgment).
4See Applewhaite v. S.S. Sunprincess, 150 F. Supp. 827, 828 (S.D.N.Y. 1956); Cardy
v. Cardy, supra note 41; cf. American Law Institute, Study of the Division of Jurisdiction
Between State and Federal Courts 311-12, 314 (1969) (within the federal system, the render-
ing court rather than the court from which recognition is sought should grant relief from a
judgment inequitably obtained).
4Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 107 (Proposed Official Draft 1967). But cf.
Barber v. Barber, 323 U.S. 77, 87 (1944) (concurring opinion); Baade, Counter-Revolution or
Alliance for Progress? Reflections on Reading Cavers, The Choice-of-Law Process, 46 Tex.
L. Rev., 141, 175-78 (1967). However, a judgment may be non-final as to some matters in
litigation, but final as to others. See Ginsburg, Judgments in Search of Full Faith and Credit:
The Last-in-Time Rule for Conflicting Judgments, 82 Harv. L. Rev. 798, 804 n. 31 (1969).
Moreover, a foreign adjudication may be res judicata in the rendition forum, even though
further proceedings would be required there prior to execution. See von Engelbrechten v.
Galvanoni & Nevy Bros., 59 Misc. 2d 721,60 Misc. 2d 419 (Civ. Ct. N.Y.C. 1969).47Compare In re Will of Heller-Baghero, 302 N.Y.S. 2d 235 (A.D. I st Dep't 1969) (2-I
opinion) (although New York proceeding for probate of 1964 will was commenced after 1962
will was offered to Austrian court, even if Austria was the death domicile, New York was not
required to relinquish jurisdiction, where over 90% of decedent's property was in New York
and New York resident was a substantial legatee under 1964 will), and Algazy v. Algazy, 135
N.Y.S. 2d 123 (Sup. Ct. 1952), affid 285 A.D. 1140, 142 N.Y.S. 2d 365 (Ist Dep't 1958)
(pending French alimony proceeding no bar to adjudication in New York which, as defend-
ant's domicile, was the more appropriate forum) with Oakland Truck Sales, Inc. v. United
States, 149 F. Supp. 902 (Ct. CIs. 1957) (action stayed pending conclusion of proceedings in
Germany, where episode in dispute occurred.
As to modifiable judgments, see text at note 65 infra.48See Stoel, The Enforcement of Foreign Non-Criminal Penal and Revenue Judgments in
England and the United States, 16 Int'l & Comp. L.Q. 663 (1967). Sister-state tax judgments,
however, fall within the full-faith-and-credit ambit. Milwaukee County v. M. E. White Co.,
296 U.S. 268 (1935).
49 See Pye, Effects of Foreign Criminal Judgments Within the United States, 34 Revue
International de Droit P6nal 55 (1963), reprinted in 32 U. Mo. (KC) L. Rev. 114 (1964).
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Foreign judgments, unlike sister-state judgments,50 may be disregarded if
the underlying claim was contrary to the public policy of the recognition
forum.5' It is frequently observed that, in principle, a public policy defense
should not prevail unless the claim on which the foreign judgment is based
is repugnant to the recognition forum's fundamental notions of decency and
justice.52 However, the label "contra public policy" is not easily contained
in this narrow corridor. It may cover a less bed-rock choice of law concern
of the recognition forum, 53  or substitute for another ground of
non-recognition, 54 or appear as a make-weight in tandem with other dis-
qualifying factors.55
Finally, conflict with another judgment entitled to recognition, 56 or with
a forum-selecting agreement5 7 are factors that may disqualify a foreign
adjudication.
5. Enforcement
Under modern practice, non-default foreign money judgments entitled to
Extradition practice in the United States is exclusively in the hands of the federal government
and is entirely dependent upon treaty arrangements. See Bassiouni, International Extradition:
A Summary of the Contemporary American Practice and a Proposed Reform, 15 Wayne L.
Rev. 733 (1969).5
°See B. Currie, The Constitution and the "Transitory" Cause of Action (Part 2), 73
Harv. L. Rev. 268, 272-79, 294, 296-98 (1959). But compare Restatement (Second) of
Conflict of Laws § 103 (Proposed Official Draft 1967); Rodgers & Rodgers, The Disparity
Between Due Process and Full Faith and Credit: The Problem of the Somewhere Wife, 67
Colum. L. Rev. 1363 (1967); von Mehren & Trautman, The Law of Multistate Problems
1458-66 (1965) (approving, in varying degrees, "interest" exceptions to sister-state judgment
recognition), with Ehrenzweig, The Second Conflicts Restatement: A Last Appeal for its
Withdrawal, 113 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1230, 1240 (1965); Comment, 54 Calif. L. Rev. 282 (1966)
(constitutional command of full faith and credit to final judgments is all encompassing).
51Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 98 comment g, § 117 comment c (Pro-
posed Official Draft 1967).
521d § 117 comment c. Applying the public policy concept in this sense, courts have
enforced foreign judgments although the underlying claim would not have been entertained in
the recognition forum. E.g., Neporany v. Kir, 5 A.D. 2d 438, 173 N.Y.S. 2d 146 (lst Dep't
1958) (Canadian judgment for seduction and criminal conversation enforced despite New
York legislation precluding such claims).53E.g., In re Gillies' Estate, 8 N.J. 88, 83 A.2d 889, 894-95 (1951) (Greek adoption
decree inconsonant with New Jersey's requirement of preliminary period of residence with
adopting parents). Cf. Zanzonico v. Neeld, 17 N.J. 490, 111 A.2d 772 (1955) (policy satisfied
where child lived continuously with adopting parents after the foreign decree issued). On the
use of public policy as an umbrella for the avoidance of explicit choice of law decisions
generally, see Paulsen & Sovern, "Public Policy" in the Conflict of Laws, 56 Colum. L. Rev.
969, 980-1016 (1956).54See note 119 infra and accompanying text.55E.g., In re Davis' Will, 31 Misc. 2d 270, 219 N.Y.S. 2d 533 (Sur. Ct. 1961) (public
policy, due process, jurisdiction); In re Topcuoglu's Will, I 1 Misc. 2d 589, 174 N.Y.S. 2d 260
"Sur. Ct. 1958) (fraud, public policy).
"56See Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 114 comment d (Proposed Official
Draft 1967); Ginsburg, Judgments in Search of Full Faith and Credit: The Last-in-Time Rule
for Conflicting Judgments, 82 Harv. L. Rev. 798, 804 (1969).
57See Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 80 (Proposed Official Draft 1967)
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recognition ordinarily will be enforced via expeditious proceedings. The
method employed remains the traditional suit on the judgment, eventuating
in a forum judgment on the foreign judgment.58 Nonetheless, rapid summa-
ry judgment proceedings now available in the federal courts and in many
state courts59 have rendered formalistic, complaints about the absence of a
specially labelled execution process (exequatur) which leads to execution
of the foreign judgment itself without the interposition of a forum judg-
ment. 60 In the case of a default judgment, however, careful examination of
the law and facts relevant to the foreign court's jurisdiction may preclude
summary adjudication.6 1 Foreign currency stated in the foreign judgment
generally will be converted into dollars as of the date of the enforcement
forum's judgment.6 2
The original Restatement of conflict of Laws took the position that,
whatever extranational judgments might be recognized, only money judg-
ments were subject to enforcement because of the "extraordinary and
discretionary character" of other remedies.63 However, Restatement (Sec-
ond) offers a qualified prediction that decrees ordering or enjoining an act
will be enforced, absent undue burden upon the American court.
64
(dealing with jurisdiction rather than judgments). On choice-of-court agreements generally, see
Lenhoff, The Parties' Choice of a Forum: Prorogation Agreements, 15 Rutgers L. Rev. 414
(1961); The Validity of Forum Selecting Clauses, 13 Am. J. Comp. L. 157 (1964); Reese, The
Model Choice of Forum Act, 17 Am. J. Comp. L. 292 (1969).58See Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 100 comment b (Proposed Official
Draft 1967).59Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. The federal model has been followed in many states. Moreover, in
some states, summary judgment procedures have been speeded for certain matters, among
them, enforcement of judgments. E.g., N.Y. CPLR § 3213 (motion for summary judgment in
lieu of complaint).60Nadelmann, Non-Recognition of American Money Judgments Abroad and What to Do
About It, 42 Iowa L. Rev. 236, 259 (1957); Lenhoff, Reciprocity: The Legal Aspect of a
Perennial Idea (Part 2), 49 Nw. U. L. Rev. 752, 763 (1955).61See Plugmay Ltd. v. National Dynamics Corp., 53 Misc. 2d 451, 278 N.Y.S. 2d 896
(Sup. Ct. 1967), reversing 48 Misc. 2d 913, 266 N.Y.S. 2d 240 (N.Y. City Civ. Ct. 1966)
(summary judgment on foreign default judgment obtained against New York manufacturer by
United Kingdom concessionaire should not have issued where circumstances required "full
disclosure of the jurisdiction of the foreign court and of the acts of the parties to the foreign
litigation"); Falcon Mfg. (Scarborough) Ltd. v. Ames, 53 Misc. 2d 332, 278 N.Y.S. 2d 684
(N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. 1967) (refusing recognition to Canadian default judgment against New York
purchaser who ordered nails by mail from Canadian seller). But cf. Cherun v. Frishman, 236
F. Supp. 292 (D.D.C. 1964) (enforcing, via summary judgment, Canadian default judgment
for debt owed by District of Columbia resident to Canadian secured by mortgage on land in
Canada).
62Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 101 comment d (Proposed Official Draft
1967).
On modes of execution in the United States, see Riesenfeld, Collection of Money Judg-
ments in American Law: A Historical Inventory and a Prospectus, 42 Iowa L. Rev. 155
(1957).
63Restatement of Conflict of Laws § 447 (1934) (applicable to sister-state as well as
foreign-country judgments).
64§ 102 comment g (Proposed Official Draft 1967).
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Formerly, the courts declined to enforce modifiable judgments, most
notably support judgments, even when rendered by a sister state. Today,
the trend is distinctly in the opposite direction, although such technically
non-final judgments are still generally considered to fall outside the full
faith and credit ambit. As to modifiable judgments rendered abroad, the
courts have indicated an inclination to follow the practice developing in the
sister-state arena.6 5
6. Status adjudications
Of the reported cases in the United States dealing with foreign nation
judgments, the largest category consists of decisions relating to status.6 6 In
this area, the policy of security of adjudication has special significance, and
the general tendency in the United States, as elsewhere, is to recognize
foreign adjudications. 6 7 On the other hand, the home state of the parties, or
one of them, may have a strong choice-of-law concern regarding the family
relationship in question. If this concern is disregarded, the home state, in
turn, may disregard the foreign determination.6 8
In the United States, where traditionally choice-of-law tests have not
been applied overtly in recognition practice, non-recognition in such cir-
cumstances has been explained on other grounds; for example, lack of
jurisdiction in the case of a divorce granted by a state where neither party
was domiciled,69 "changed circumstances" in custody cases,70 and "public
65See Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 109 (Proposed Official Draft 1967).
As in the case of sister-state support decrees, the respondent has been afforded the same
opportunity to litigate questions concerning his obligation as would have been afforded to him
in the original court. See Herczog v. Herczog, 186 Cal. App.2d 318, 9 Calif. Rptr. 5 (1960).
Under the New York statute authorizing modification and enforcement of foreign support
orders, N.Y. Family Court Act 466(c), it is an open question whether the modification
petitioner must show that the decree was modifiable where rendered. See Goldberg v.
Goldberg, 57 Misc.2d 224, 291 N.Y.S.2d 482 (Fam. Ct. 1968) (downward modification
allowed although wife urged that original Mexican court could not modify separation agree-
ment incorporated in Mexican divorce decree).
86See Peterson, Res Judicata and Foreign Country Judgments, 24 Ohio St. L. J. 291,
295-96 (1963).
67See Smit, International Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel in the United States, 9
U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 44, 64-66 (1962).
68See von Mehren & Trautman, Recognition of Foreign Adjudications: A Survey and a
Suggested Approach, 81 Harv. L. Rev. 1601, 1636, 1645-46 (1968).691d. at 1638.
7 0The Supreme Court has not yet decided whether, as between states of the United
States, custody decrees are entitled to full faith and credit. See Restatement (Second) of
Conflict of Laws § 103 comment b (Proposed Official Draft 1967). As to foreign-nation
decrees, see generally Ehrenzweig, Recognition of Custody Decrees Rendered Abroad, 2
Am. J. Comp. L. 167 (1953). Case law is untidy, although it reveals that generally the welfare
("best interests") of the child is the paramount factor. Compare Application of Lang, 9
A.D.2d 401, 193 N.Y.S.2d 763 (1959), aftd, 7 N.Y. 2d 1029, 200 N.Y.S.2d 71 (1960) (Swiss
custody decree recognized where no change in circumstances was shown, although party
granted custody under Swiss decree acted in deliberate violation of temporary order of New
York court), with Kubon v. Kubon, 51 Cal.2d 229, 331 P.2d 636 (1958) (custody controversy
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policy" in adoption cases. 71 The recognition accorded by New York courts
to bilateral (consent) one-day Mexican divorces obtained by New York-
ers 72 is a singular, but significant exception to the general prac-
tice- significant because numerically Mexican divorce decrees currently
head the list of foreign adjudications for which recognition has been
claimed in the United States; singular because New York is apparently the
only state that has given judicial recognition to Mexican one-day consent
divorces. 73 Recently, however, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
approved the New York approach to bilateral Mexican divorces, and
required their recognition in the Virgin Islands. 74
7. Legislation and potential treaty development: the
Uniform Foreign Money-Judgment Recognition Act
While states of the United States have established generous recognition
practices, the development to date has been unilateral. The treaty approach
in which California refused to recognize Nevada adjudication where party obtaining Nevada
decree acted in violation of temporary order of California court). Cf. Venizelos v. Venizelos,
30 A.D.2d 856, 293 N.Y.S.2d 20 (2d Dep't 1968) (Greek decree rejected without ex-
planation); Adamsen v. Adamsen, 195 A.2d 418 (Conn. 1963) (effect of foreign judgment
determining custody is the same whether it is the judgment of a foreign nation or of a sister
state).71E.g., In re Gillies Estate, 8 N.J. 88, 83 A.2d 889 (1951).72Rosenstiel v. Rosenstiel, 16 N.Y.2d 64, 262 N.Y.S.2d 86 (1965). For a critical
appraisal, see D. Currie, Suitcase Divorce in the Conflict of Laws: Simons, Rosenstiel and
Borax, 34 U. Chi. L. Rev. 26, 44-64 (1966). Cf. Gorie v. Gorie, 26 A.D.2d 368, 274
N.Y.S.2d 985 (Ist Dep't 1966) (refusing recognition of a one-day Mexican divorce where, at
the time the decree issued, the divorce state (Tlaxcala, Mexico) had a six-month residence
requirement; noting the distinction between sister state and extra-national judgments in this
regard, the court ruled that non-recognition was required under New York "concepts ofjurisprudence" even if collateral attack on the decree would not be allowed in Mexico).73See Warrender v. Warrender, 79 N.J. Super. 114, 190 A.2d 684 (App. Div. 1963), aff'd
without opinion, 42 N.J. 287, 200 A.2d 123 (1964) (one-day Mexican consent divorce
declared void); Lucas v. Lucas, 232 F. Supp. 466 (D. Canal Zone 1964) (Sherrer rule
precluding subject-matter jurisdiction attack on bilateral sister-state divorce decree does not
apply to foreign divorces).74Perrin v. Perrin, 408 F.2d 107 (3d Cir. 1969); see Kay, Book Review, 21 J. Legal Ed.
613, 616 (1969); Annot., 13 A.L.R.3d 1401, 1433, 1441 (1967). Compare Estate of Borax v.
Commissioner, 349 F.2d 666 (2d Cir. 1965) ("recognizing" for income-tax purposes, one-day,
non-consent Mexican divorce held void by New York), with Rev. Rul. 67-442, 1967-2 Cum.
Bull. 65 (contrary position maintained by Internal Revenue Service).
However, the New York judiciary is not alone in recognizing that a jurisdictional base
other than domicile may suffice in divorce cases. See Alton v. Alton, 207 F.2d 667, 678 (3d
Cir. 1953) (dissenting opinion severing the jurisdiction and choice-of-law issues); Scott v.
Scott, 51 Cal.2d 249, 331 P.2d 641, 644-45 (1958) (concurring opinion); cf. Restatement
(Second) of Conflict of Laws § 72 (Proposed Official Draft 1967).
Discussions on recognition of foreign country divorce decrees include Comment, Recogni-
tion of Foreign Divorce Decrees, 32 U. Chi. L. Rev. 802 (1965); Note, Mexican Bilateral
Divorce, 61 Nw. U. L. Rev. 584 (1966); Annotation, 13 A.L.R. 3d 1419 (1967). See also
Note, United States Recognition of Foreign Non-Judicial Divorces, 53 Minn. L. Rev. 612
(1969).
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to judgment recognition, familiar and generally preferred in civil-law coun-
tries, 75 remains untried in the United States. 76 The federal system offers a
partial explanation for this state of affairs. Only the federal government
may negotiate treaties, but, as indicated earlier, foreign-judgment recogni-
tion and enforcement practice is presently considered a matter of state
law.77 Nevertheless, the area is susceptible of "federalization" because of
its close association with foreign relations. 78 Moreover, even if recognition
practice were not brought within the domain of federal law, treaties could
be negotiated for the benefit of those states that accepted the obligations of
the treaty. 79 A contribution toward eventual pursuit of such a cooperative
federal-state approach is the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recogni-
tion Act.8 0 The Act, which purports to codify settled common-law rules,
has been carefully analyzed in a recent study.8 '
This statute provides that a foreign judgment qualifying for recognition
"is enforceable in the same manner as the judgment of a sister state entitled
to full faith and credit."8 2 So far as procedure is concerned, this provision
envisions enforcement via summary-judgment applications, that offer dis-
patch at least equal to that offered by the standard exequatur procedure of
civil-law countries.8 3 The Commissioners on Uniform State Laws con-
templated enforcement via the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judg-
ments Act of 1948.84 Under this Act, the judgment creditor may obtain an
immediate levy upon property of the judgment debtor; but sale must await
notice to the debtor and an opportunity for the presentation of defenses.85
75See Graupner, Some Recent Aspects of the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Judgments in Western Europe, 12 Int'l & Comp. L. Q. 367, 368 (1963); Kulzer, Enforceabil-
ity of Foreign Judgments, 16 Buff. L. Rev. 84 (1966).76But cf. Section 8 infra (United States accession to United Nations Convention on
Recognition and Enforcement of Arbitral Awards).
77See note 14 supra.78See Reese, The Status in This Country of Judgments Rendered Abroad, 50 Colum. L.
Rev. 783, 788 (1950). Recent Supreme Court decisions have stressed the importance of
federal control in matters affecting foreign relations. Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968);
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 424-25 (1964). These decisions may
presage a change in the situation currently prevailing with respect to foreign-nation judgment
recognition and enforcement. Cf. Nadelmann, The Common Market Judgments Convention
and a Hague Conference Recommendation: What Steps Next? 82 Harv. L. Rev. 1282 (1969).
79See Nadelmann, Uniform Legislation Versus International Conventions Revisited, 16
Am. J. Comp. L. 28, 31-33 (1968).
809B U.L.A. 64 (1966). The Act is currently in force in California, Illinois, Maryland,
Massachusetts (with a reciprocity clause), Michigan and Oklahoma.
81Kulzer, Recognition of Foreign Country Judgments in New York: The Uniform For-
eign Money-Judgments Recognition Act, 18 Buff. L. Rev. 1 (1969).
82§ 3.
83See note 59 supra and accompanying text.
"See 9B U.L.A. 67 (1966).
a9A U.L.A. 474 (1965); see Leflar, The New Uniform Foreign Judgments Acts, 24
N.Y.U. L. Q. 336 (1949).
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A revised (1964) Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act has
been proposed for sister-state judgments.8 6 The 1964 Act provides for an
automatic registration procedure, it puts the burden on the judgment debtor
to stop the otherwise uninterrupted progression from registration to execu-
tion measures. Such a system has operated since 1948 among the federal
courts.87 In view of the significant differences between the interstate and
international areas, it would seem imprudent to authorize the same
push-button style enforcement procedure for foreign-nation judgments.8 8
Denial of recognition to foreign country adjudications is mandated by
the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act in only three
instances: 89 when "the judgment was rendered under a system which does
not provide impartial tribunals or procedures compatible with the require-
ments of due process of law"; when "the foreign court did not have
personal jurisdiction over the defendant"; or when "the foreign court did
not have jurisdiction over the subject matter." The last of these stipulations
is questionable. The Uniform Act apparently requires reference to foreign
law to determine whether the foreign court had subject-matter jurisdiction,
but reference to local law to determine the consequences of an absence of
subject-matter jurisdiction.90 By contrast, with respect to sister-state judg-
ments, the rendition forum's law is controlling on both questions.91 In the
United States, particularly in the context of federal-state divisions of au-
thority, lack of subject-matter jurisdiction constitutes a lingering objection
to adjudication. 92 In unitary foreign systems, however, rules concerning the
competence of a particular court to hear a particular kind of case often
occupy less hallowed ground. In view of the diverse settings in which the
issue might arise, it would appear preferable to rank lack-of-subject-matter
jurisdiction as a permissive rather than mandatory ground for
non-recognition. 93
-9A U.L.A. 486 (1965).
8728 U.S.C. § 1967.
88See generally Kulzer, Programs for Improving Foreign Judgment Enforcement in New
York: The Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act, 18 Buff. L. Rev. 53 (1969).
89§ 4(a).
9 0Accord, Gorie v. Gorie, 26 A.D.2d 368, 274 N.Y.S.2d 985 (lst Dep't 1966) (where
Mexican court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction under its own rules "it is of no moment that
the defendant has not shown that [collateral] attack would be allowed in Mexico").
91See Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 92 comment i, §§ 97, 105 (Proposed
Official Draft 1967).
For exceptional situations in which, for purposes of deciding a particular issue, it may be
appropriate for the recognition forum to "validate a void judgment," see von Mehren &
Trautman, supra note 68, at 163 1-32. But see Restatement (Second), supra § 105 comment b,
illustration 1.9 2See American Law Institution, Study of the Division of Jurisdiction Between State and
Federal Courts, pt. 1, 106-114 (Proposed Final Draft 1965).
93 See Kulzer, Recognition of Foreign Country Judgments in New York: The Uniform
Foreign Money Judgments Recognition Act, 18 Buff. L. Rev. 1, 27-29 (1969).
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While the Act contains no elaboration of the subject-matter jurisdiction
requirement, it deals more precisely with the requirement of personal
jurisdiction. Six specific bases are listed:94 personal service in the foreign
state; voluntary appearance, except when made to protect property or
contest jurisdiction; consent by choice-of-court agreement; domicile; oper-
ation of a business office in the foreign state, when the claim arises out of
such operation; operation of a motor vehicle or airplane in the foreign
state, when the claim arises out of such operation. The person-
al-jurisdiction requirement must be held satisfied if any one of these bases
activated the foreign court. Following the list of specific bases is a stipula-
tion that the courts of the enacting state may recognize other bases. This
stipulation concerning other bases suggests that a jurisdictional base ac-
cepted for domestic courts may not be appropriate internationally95 and,
conversely, that a base used by a foreign court, although not available
locally, may be sufficient for recognition purposes.98 It would permit an
approach to jurisdiction under which neither the foreign system's rules nor
the forum's own would control, but focus would be placed on the funda-
mental question whether the foreign court had a connection with the
parties and the litigated matter sufficient to warrant adjudication by it. 97
Although the list of six recognized bases includes the transient service
rule, that "exorbitant" jurisdictional base peculiar to the common law,98 a
further provision of the Act adds a significant qualification. In line with the
approach just suggested, the Act indicates that personal service alone, even
if enough for purposes of domestic adjudication, may be insufficient when
international enforcement is the issue. Specifically, the provision calls for a
forum-non-conveniens test:99 A foreign judgment need not be recognized
if, in the case of jurisdiction based only on personal service, the foreign
court was a seriously inconvenient forum for the trial of the action.
Permissive grounds for non-recognition, in addition to forum non con-
94§ 5.9 5See Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 98 comment d (Proposed Official
Draft 1967); Plugmay Ltd. v. National Dynamics Corp., 53 Misc.2d 451, 278 N.Y.S.2d 896
(Sup. Ct. 1967), reversing 48 Misc.2d 913, 266 N.Y.S.2d 240 (N.Y. City Civ. Ct. 1966).
96See von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 68, at 1619-21.971bid. Cf. Hague Conference Draft Convention on the Recognition of Divorces and
Legal Separations (1968) art. 17, English text in 16 Am. J. Comp. L. 582, 585 (1968)
(contracting state may apply rules more favorable to recognition than those specified in the
convention).
98See Cowen, Transient Jurisdiction, A British View, 9 J. Pub. L. 303 (1960); Ehren-
zweig, The Transient Rule of Personal Jurisdiction: The "Power" Myth and Forum Con-
veniens, 65 Yale L. J. 289 (1956); Kurland, In Personam Jurisdiction, 25 U. Chi. L. Rev. 569
(1958); Schlesinger, Methods of Progress in Conflict of Laws, 9 J. Pub. L. 313 (1960).
9§ 4(b) (6). Cf. Uniform Interstate and International Procedure Act § 1.05, 9B U.L.A.
305, 314 (1966): When the court finds that in the interest of substantial justice the action
should be heard in another forum, the court may stay or dismiss the action....
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veniens, where jurisdiction is predicated on personal service alone, are:100
lack of notice to the defendant in sufficient time to enable him to defend;
fraud in obtaining the judgment; repugnance of the claim on which the
judgment is based to the public policy of the recognition forum; conflict
with another final and conclusive judgment; and conflict with an agreement
between the parties under which the dispute was to be settled by means
other than proceedings in the court that rendered the judgment.
Entrance by the United States into treaties on judgment recognition is
no longer the remote possibility it seemed in past decades, when this
country did not take part in multi-nation efforts to harmonize practice in
the private international-law area.10' In 1963, the United States became an
active participant in the Hague Conference on Private International Law
and the International (Rome) Institute for the Unification of Private
Law.10 2 It strongly supported and was the first nation to ratify the Hague
Convention on the Service of Documents Abroad. 03 Similar treatment of
the more recent Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad
seems likely.' 0 4 Significantly, legislative activity at home preceded, and
helped to assure a cordial reception for, these multilateral texts. 05 Thus,
100§ 4(b)(I)-(5). As to these grounds for non-recognition, see text at notes 38-45, 50-57
supra.
10
aFears that the federal system posed great difficulties for United States participation
account in good measure for the long period of abstention. See Nadelmann, The United States
Joins the Hague Conference on Private International Law, 30 Law & Contemp. Prob. 291
(1965); Nadelmann, Ignored State Interests: The Federal Government and International
Efforts to Unify Rules of Private Law, 102 U. Pa. L. Rev. 323 (1954).
102 United States participation was authorized by S. Res. 781, H.R.J. Res. 778, 88th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1963). On the initial years of United States participation, see Kearney,
Progress Report- International Unification of Private Law, 23 The Record of the Bar of the
City of New York 220 (1968); Amram, Report on the Eleventh Session of the Hague
Conference on Private International Law, 63 Am. J. Int'l L. 521 (1969).
Earlier, Congress had created the Commission on International Rules of Judicial Procedure
and assigned to it the task of "investigating existing procedures of judicial assistance and
cooperation between the United States and foreign countries with a view to achieving
improvement." Act of Sept. 2, 1958, 72 Stat. 1743. Notable reforms in domestic procedure
were developed or contributed to by the Commission with the assistance of the Columbia
Law School Project on International Procedure. See Smit, International Litigation under the
United States Code, 65 Colum. L. Rev. 1015 (1965); Smit, New Rules of Civil Procedure
Regulating Service and the Taking of Depositions in Foreign Countries, 11 Am. J. Comp. L.
436 (1962); Miller, Federal Rule 44.1 and the "Fact" Approach to Determining Foreign Law:
Death Knell for a Die-Hard Doctrine, 65 Mich. L. Rev. 613 (1967). Reforms in state
procedure which parallel the federal reforms appear in the Uniform Interstate and In-
ternational Procedure Act, 9B U.L.A. 305 (1966). For a thorough description and analysis of
this Act, see Smit, Report of Whether to Adopt in New York, in whole or in part, the
Uniform Interstate and International Procedure Act, Report of the Advisory Board of the
New York Judicial Conference for the year July I, 1966-June 30, 1967, 130-93.
103See Amram, United States Ratification of the Hague Convention on Service of
Documents Abroad, 61 Am. J. Int'l L. 1019 (1969).
1
04 See Amram, The Proposed Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad, 55
A.B.A.J. 651 (1969).
1 05See note 102 supra.
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the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act could well serve
as a foundation for, or at least give impetus to, United States participation
in multi-lateral or bilateral treaties on the recognition and enforcement of
foreign judgments.
8. Arbitration awards: United States accession to the United Nations
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Arbitral Awards
The step still on the horizon for judgments has already been taken with
respect to arbitration agreements and awards. After World War II, the
United States entered into a number of bilateral treaties of Friendship,
Commerce and Navigation containing provisions on recognition and en-
forcement of arbitration agreements and awards.'08 Ultimately, at the end
of 1968, United States accession to the United Nations Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Arbitral Awards was approved by the
Senate. 107 This action augurs well for the eventual consummation of in-
ternational agreements on judgment recognition and enforcement, for many
of the factors that contributed to the initial hesitancy of the United States
regarding the UN-sponsored arbitration convention also bear on the issue
of treaty solutions with respect to judgments. The arbitration convention is,
of course, important in its own right. In view of the high incidence of
arbitration in commercial matters, members of the business community
engaged in international trade are likely to consider it at least as significant
as any treaty on judgment recognition.
The convention was formulated at the United Nations Conference on
Arbitration held in New York in 1958. While most of the forty-five nations
that participated in the Conference promptly acceded to the convention,
10OSee Quigley, Accession by the United States to the United Nations Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 70 Yale L.J. 1049, 1051-54
(1961).
107See Exec. Rep. No. 10, 90th Cong. 2d Sess. (1968) (report submitted by Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations); Executive E, 90th Cong. 2d Sess. (1968).
Approval of accession to the arbitration convention was made subject to the two declara-
tions for which provision is made in the convention: (1) convention benefits will be limited by
the United States to nations that have assumed the obligations of the convention; (2) the
convention will apply only to differences arising out of legal relationships considered com-
mercial under the federal law of the United States. For the United States, the second
declaration is intended to make clear the exclusion of matters of state concern, such as title to
real property. See Exec. Rep. No. 10., supra at p. 9. For civil-law countries with separate civil
and commercial codes, it excludes matters governed by the civil code. See Executive E, supra
at p. 18. With respect to the decision of the United States to include the reciprocity
declaration, cf. Nadelmann, The Common Market Judgments Convention and a Hague
Conference Recommendation: What Steps Next?, 82 Harv. L. Rev. 1282 (1969); Reese, The
Status in This Country of Judgments Rendered Abroad, 50 Colum. L. Rev. 783, 793 (1950)
(reciprocity requirements, although generally undesirable, may provide a useful bargaining
weapon fr the United States in negotiating treaties).
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the United States delegation recommended against immediate action. The
delegation expressed a number of concerns. Was the traditional opposition
of common-law courts to arbitration dating from seventeenth century Eng-
lish precedent a relic of the past, ready for consignment to the scrap heap
of history? Would accession to the convention by the federal government
encroach upon an area of serious concern to the states? Would there be
widespread acceptance of the convention in the world community? Would
the American business community favor it?
Developments during the ensuing ten years quieted the fears voiced in
1958. The turnabout in judicial attitude toward arbitration had become
apparent. Courts in commercial centers plagued with congested dockets
"no longer view(ed) agreements to 'oust their jurisdiction' with the jaun-
diced eye of yesteryear."'108 With respect to federal-state relations, a 1967
decision of the United States Supreme Court made it clear that arbitration
concerning interstate or foreign commerce was encompassed within the
federal domain, and that in such cases, the United States Arbitration
Act'0 9 rather than state law governed enforcement proceedings in federal
courts." 0 Thirty-three countries, including major trading nations, had be-
come parties to the convention. Legal advisers to businesses engaged in
foreign trade expressed their strong support. It was pointed out that acces-
sion would involve no fundamental change in United States law, for the
United States Arbitration Act already provided for enforcement of agree-
ments and awards of the kind dealt with in the convention."' On the other
hand, failure of the United States to become a party to the convention
impeded efforts of American businessmen to enforce arbitration awards
against parties located in foreign countries. In addition to facilitating the
enforcement of American awards, the convention offered the advantage of
greater flexibility in selecting the place of arbitration. Because acceptance
of the convention was widespread, the forum decision could be made to
depend less upon the presence of assets subject to execution, and more
upon convenience for arbitration. Moreover, the latitude for party autono-
my implicit in the convention provisions received favorable comment: the
parties' choice of law would be effective whether or not it corresponded to
their choice of forum; 1 2 they could subject to their private agreement the
108Cook v. Kuljian Corp., 201 F. Supp. 531, 534 (E.D. Pa. 1962).
1099 U.S.C. §§ 1-14.
"°Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 404-05 (1967).
111 See, e.g., Standard Magnesium Corp. v. Otto Fuchs K.G. Metallwerke, 251 F.2d 455
(10th Cir. 1957) (American court order requiring arbitration is not prerequisite to enforcement
of Norwegian award under United States Arbitration Act). Legislation implementing the
convention, however, will eliminate the $10,000 amount-in-controversy requirement other-
wise applicable to commencement of proceedings under the Act. Proposed 9 U.S.C. § 203.
112Art. V(1)(a) (by implication).
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procedures as well as the composition of the arbitration tribunal.1 13 Finally,
and perhaps the most important factor leading to reversal of the initial
United States attitude, the 1963 Congressional authorization for United
States participation in the Hague Conference and the Rome Institute" 4
marked the end of the era in which the government of the United States
remained aloof from multi-nation efforts to promote international coopera-
tion and agreement on private-law matters.
Legislation to implement the convention is to be made a part of the
United States Arbitration Act."15 The legislation provides for both original
and removal jurisdiction in the federal district courts, over all proceedings
in which the convention is applicable. Where enforcement of an agreement
is concerned, the court is authorized to direct the parties to proceed to
arbitration at any place specified in the agreement, whether such place is
within or without the United States. 116 Enforcement of awards to which
the convention applies may be obtained by application to a federal district
court, filed within three years after rendition of the award. Confirmation of
such awards is mandatory unless the court finds one of the grounds for
refusal or deferral of recognition or enforcement specified in the Con-
vention.
Among the grounds for such refusal of recognition are: the person
against whom the award is invoked did not receive notice, or otherwise
lacked adequate opportunity to present his case;11 7 recognition or enforce-
ment would be contrary to the requested forum's public policy."18 Al-
though the only explicit due-process guarantee relates to notice and oppor-
tunity to be heard, the Department of State memorandum on the con-
vention artiqles states: "Because of the close link between the concept of
due process and the public policy of the forum, the enforcing State could
apply additional standards of due process pursuant to the public policy
ground...,"1 19 For these additional standards of due process, domestic
precedent under the United States Arbitration Act is likely to guide the
courts.
1 20
UaArt. V(1)(d) (by implication).
"14See note 102 supra.
1159 U.S.C. The proposed legislation adds on additional chapter to the Act containing
§§ 201-208.
1"6The United States Arbitration Act, absent the new chapter implementing the con-
vention, permits a court to require arbitration only in its own district. 9 U.S.C. § 4.
117Art. V(1)(b) (mandatory ground).
"
8Art. V(2)(b) (discretionary ground).
"
9 Executive E, supra note 107 at p. 20. However, the memorandum also cautions that
abuse of the public-policy ground for non-recognition should be discouraged by Article XIV
of the convention which provides that a contracting state shall not be entitled to invoke the
convention against other contracting parties except to the extent that it is itself bound by the
convention.
120 See, e.g., Commonwealth Coating Corp. v. Continental Gas Co., 393 U.S. 145 (1968)
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9. Conclusion
The United States experience indicates that a generous but unilateral
approach to the requests of foreign litigants and tribunals is unlikely to
solve the problems engendered by domestic litigation with international
aspects. As to service of documents, and obtaining evidence abroad, the
United States is pursuing the course familiar to and trusted by many of its
partners in the world community. After considerable hesitation, it has
followed the same course with respect to arbitration agreements and
awards. Similar developments for judgment recognition and enforcement,
although not yet clearly visible, are likely eventual prospects. United
States experts have reported favorably on the Hague Conference Draft
Convention on the Recognition of Divorces and Legal Separations
(1968).121 As to the Hague Conference Draft Convention on the Recogni-
tion and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial
Matters (1966), experts consider that it "well reflects current thinking here
and abroad on sound rules for recognition and enforcement of foreign
money-judgments.' 12 2 However, reservations have been expressed con-
cerning United States accession, stemming in large measure from the
problem created by the separate convention signed by the Common Mar-
ket nations.1 23
(award set aside as procured by "undue means" where impartial arbitrator, although not
charged with actual bias, had an undisclosed consulting relationship with the successful party).
121See Amram, Report on the Eleventh Session of the Hague Conference on Private
International Law, 63 Am. J. Int'l Law 521, 522-24 (1969); von Mehren, Introductory Note
to the text in 16 Am. J. Comp. L. 580 (1968); Nadelmann, Habitual Residence and Nation-
ality as Tests at the Hague: The 1968 Convention on Recognition of Divorces, 47 Tex. L.
Rev. 766 (1969); Reese, The Hague Draft Convention on the Recognition of Foreign
Divorces: A Comment, 14 Am. J. Comp. L. 692 (1966).122Nadelmann & von Mehren, The Extraordinary Session of the Hague Conference on
Private International Law, 60 Am. J. Int'l L. 803, 806 (1966).
123See text at note 34 supra: Amram, note 121 supra, 63 Am. J. Int'l L. at 528-29; cf.
Nadelmann, The Common Market Convention and a Hague Conference Recommendation,
What Steps Next?, 82 Harv. L. Rev. 1282 (1969).
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